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The Dangers of "General Observations"
on Expert Scientific Testimony:
A Comment on Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
BY ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST*
Expert opinion ... is only an ordinary guess in evening clothes ..
INTRODUCTION
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,' the Supreme Court of
the United States-Justice Blackmun speaking for everyone but Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justice Stevens'-held that the "general
acceptance" test of Frye v. United States4 was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. In the course of
ruling on the question presented-the appropriate "standard for admitting
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial"5-the Blackmun opinion
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.S. 1973, University of
Pennsylvania (Wharton School). J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School. My thanks go to Daniel
A. Farber for helpful comments on a previous draft. Copyright © 1993, Robert F.
Blomquist.
' Earl M. Kerstetter, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. 1961), quoted
in FRED R. SHAPIRo, THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 135
(1993).
2 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
3 Justices Rehnquist and Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. The
Justices joined in Parts I and 1-A of the opinion, as well as the Court's holding that "the
Frye rule did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence ... ." I at
2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They dissented, however,
from what they viewed as the Court's engaging in construction of "Rules 702 and 703
very much in the abstract [while] ... offer[ing] some 'general observations' about
scientific expert testimony. Id.
4 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
6 Justice Blackunu may have enjoyed the intellectual challenge of the Daubert case
in light of his undergraduate major of mathematics at Harvard. See THE OxFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES 75-77 (Kermit L. Hall et
al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter OxFORD COMPANION]. Moreover, "[h]is early interest in
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indulged in "some general observations"7 concerning the "[m]any factors
[that] will bear on the inquiry"8 of whether or not a federal trial court
judge should accept or reject a proffer of expert testimony.9
The broad contours of Justice Blaclanun's opinion for the Court are
relatively straightforward:
1. Frye's test, whereby an expert opinion based on a scientific
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as
reliable in the relevant scientific community, was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (the "Rules").'0
2. The Rules occupy the field. Although the common law of evi-
dence may serve as an aid to the application of the Rules, the common
law never assimilated Frye into the general structure of the Rules."
3. Neither the Rules as a whole nor the text and legislative history
of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any
indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary condition precedent to
the admissibility of scientific evidence.12
medicine was reflected in his service as counsel for the Mayo Clinic. In 1959, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
to fill the seat vacated by John Sanborn, for whom Blackmun had clerked." Id. at 75-76.
Justice Blacknun's judicial philosophy has undergone considerable evolution during
his many years on the Supreme Court.
The "third man!' after the defeated nominations of Justice Clement Haynsworth
and G. Harold Carswell, Blackmun was appointed to the Supreme Court by
President Richard Nixon. He was at the time a little-known federal judge, and
it was thought he would bring to the Court the same values as his friend Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger, playing his part in Nixon's effort to reorient the Court
in a conservative ideological direction. Initially, Blackmun's voting was quite
close to Burger's-something Burger may have taken for granted-and they were
sometimes referred to as the "Minnesota Twins." He was quiet, even diffident,
and a slow writer, which limited his influence within the Court. As he became
more sure of himself, however, he moved away from Burger toward the liberal
end of the Court, becoming outspoken and explicit in his efforts to keep an
increasingly conservative Court on center.
Id.
Justice Blackmun's best-known opinions for the Court are his abortion opinions. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). He also wrote
for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
holding that local governments are subject to minimum wage requirements.
7 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
'Id.
9Id.
'0 Id. at 2793-94.
" Id. at 2794.
12 Id.
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4. Judicial imposition of the rigid "general acceptance" test would be
contrary to the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of
removing barriers to "opinion testimony."' 3
5. Rule 702, among other provisions of the Rules, provides proper
limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence by entrusting the trial
court with a twofold gatekeeping function: (a) to determine that an
expert's testimony is based on a reliable foundation 4 and (b) to ascertain
that the expert's testimony is relevant to the issue at bar.'5
Id. The Court ended Part 1-A of its opinion by observing:
Because we hold that Frye has been superseded and base the discussion that
follows on the content of the congressionally-enacted Federal Rules of
Evidence, we do not address petitioners' argument that application of the Frye
rule in this diversity case, as the application of a judge-made rule affecting
substantive rights, would violate the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 ... (1938).
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 n.6.
14 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. In the course of reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied extensively on amicus curiae briefs submitted in the case. The Court reasoned as
follows:
The primary locus of [a trial court judge's evidentiary] obligation is Rule
702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and
theories about which an expert may testify. "If scieniuftc, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue" an expert '!may testify thereto." The subject of an
expert's testimony must be "scientific ... knowledge." The adjective "scientif-
ic" implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the
word 'nowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. The term "applies to any body of known facts or to any body of
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds." Webster's
Third New Int'l. Dictionary 1252 (1986). Of course, it would be unreasonable
to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be "known' to a
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. See, e.g., Brief for
Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae 9 ("Indeed, scientists do not assert
that they know what is immutably 'true'-they are committed to searching for
new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena"); Brief for
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National
Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae 7-8 ("Science is not an encyclopedic
body of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a process for
proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject
to further testing and refinement") (emphasis in original). But, in order to
qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., "good grounds," based on what is known. In short, the
requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge"
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (footnotes omitted).
"' Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. In the course of illustrating the requirement of
1993-94]
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6. In carrying out his or her evidentiary responsibilities under Rule
702, the trial judge faced with a proffer of scientific testimony should
first undertake a preliminary assessment of whether the expert's underly-
ing reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and relevant." A
variety of factors may influence the trial judge's inquiry, including, but
not limited to, the following: 7 (a) whether the theory or technique in
question "can be (and has been) tested";" (b) whether it has been peer
relevance for admissibility of scientific evidence, the Court provided an interesting
example:
Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony "assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue:' This condition
goes primarily to relevance .... The consideration has been aptly described ...
as one of "fit." . . . "Fit" is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one
purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.....
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific
"knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact
in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain
night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Rule 702's
'"helpfulness" standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.
Id at 2795-96 (citations omitted).
16 Id at 2796. Rule 104(a), which requires this preliminary inquiry by the trial court
judge, provides:
"Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to
conditional admissions]. In making its determination it is not bound by the rules
of evidence except those with respect to privileges."
Id n-10 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 104(a)).
17 Ia at 2796. "We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake
this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are appropriate." Id. (emphasis
added).
"' Id. Relying upon a variety of scholarly secondary sources to justify this factor, the
Court noted that "[s]cientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified, indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes
science from other fields of human inquiry." Id (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert
Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)). The Court
also recognized that "the statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable
of empirical test," idL at 2797 (quoting CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL
SCIENCE 49 (1966)), and that "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its
[Vol. 82
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reviewed and published; 9 (c) the known or potential error rate if a
particular scientific technique is utilized;2 (d) "the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling [the theory's] operation"', and (e)
whether the expert's opinion has attracted widespread acceptance within
a relevant scientific community."
7. The Rule 702 inquiry, mandated by the Court, is a "flexible one.
Its overarching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus ... [of the inquiry, however,] must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gener-
ate.
, ,23
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." Id (quoting Sin KARL R. POPPER, CONJEC-
TURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
9 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Again, the Court relied upon several scholarly
secondary sources to validate this factor.
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of
admissibility; it does not necessarily con-elate with reliability,. .. and in some
instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published
.... Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited
interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific
community is a component of "good science," in part because it increases the
likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. The fact of
publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a
particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
Id (citations omitted).
2 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Id (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979)).
2 Id. The Court noted-
A "reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination
of a particular degree of acceptance within that community." Widespread
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible,
and "a known technique that has been able to attract only minimal support
within the community" may properly be viewed with skepticism.
Id (citations omitted).
' Id Observing that a number of judicial and scholarly authorities had previously
"presented variations on the reliability approach, each with its own slightly different set
of factors," id n.12, the Court acknowledged that to the extent that these other authorities
"focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying
principles, all these versions may well have merit, although we express no opinion
regarding any of their particular details." Id
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
8. Other applicable Rules such as Rules 703,. 706,' and 4032 may
impact "a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 '  and
should be carefully considered by a trial court judge.
9. Rather than seeking strict exclusion of evidence under the rigid
Frye "general acceptance" standard, an advocate seeking to challenge
reliable and relevant scientific evidence can utilize a host of other, less
restrictive trial techniques including "cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof." On
the other hand, the risk that limited judicial screening, mandated by the
Court under Rule 702, may "on occasion ... prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations .... [is a result of] the
balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding, but for the particularized
resolution of legal disputes."
L REHNQUIST'S CRITICISMS
The opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, made a number of trenchant criticisms of the
majority opinion. While joining in Part I and Part II-A of the Court's
' "Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay
are to be admitted only if the facts or data are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."' Id. at
2797-98 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 703).
2' "Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert
of its own choosing." Id. at 2798.
" "Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence 'if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury."' l (quoting FED. R. EvID. 403). The Court further explained that
since expert testimony tends to be misleading because of the difficulty in discerning its
meaning and efficacy and tends to be powerful in its impact on the factfinder, the trial
court should exercise more control over expert witnesses than over lay witnesses in
counterbalancing possible prejudice with probative force. Id.
27 Id. at 2797.
2 Id. at 2798.
Id. at 2798-99. In an intriguing philosophical footnote to the quoted assertion in
the text; the Court observed:
This is not to say that judicial interpretation, as opposed to adjudicative
factfinding, does not share basic characteristics of the scientific endeavor. "The
work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another ephemeral .... In the
endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross
and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine."
Ia at 2799 n.13 (quoting BENAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PRoCESS 178, 179 (1921)).
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opinion, which held that the Frye rle did not survive the promulgation of the
Rules, the Chief Justice contended that the further question presented in the
petition for certiorari was mooted." Accordingly, he stated his overarching
objection to the Courts "proceed[ing] to construe Rules 702 and 703 very
much in the abstract, and ... [to the Court] offer[ing of] some 'general
observations'."'3 As Rehnquist pointed out:
"General observations"bythis Court customarily carrygreatweight with
lower federal courts, but the ones offered here suffer from the flaw common
to most such observations-they are not applied to deciding whether or not
particular testimony was or was not admissible, and therefore they tend to
be not only general, but vague and abstract. This is particularly unfortunate
in a case such as this, where the ultimate legal question depends on an
appreciation of one or more bodies of knowledge not judicially noticeable,
and subject to different interpretations in the briefs of the parties and their
airnci.
2
In this regard, the Chief Justice was alarmed by the number of amicus
briefs filed in the case and by the reliance that the Daubert Court placed on
the "amicus briefs and other secondary sources."' Rehnquist contended that
his concern was justified:
The various briefs filed in this case are markedly different from typical
briefs, in that large parts of them do not deal with decided cases or statutory
language-the sort of material [that the Supreme Court] customarily
interpret[s]. Instead, [the amicus briefs] deal with definitions of scientific
knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review-in short,
matters far afield from the expertise ofjudges. This is not to say that such
materials are not useful or even necessary in deciding how Rule 703 should
be applied; but it is to say that the unusual subject matter should cause us
to proceed with great caution in deciding more than we have to, because our
reach can so easily exceed our grasp.
30 Danbert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993)
(Relmquist, C.J., concuning in part and dissenting in part). According to Rehnquist, the
mooted question was "if Frye remains valid, whether it requires expert scientific
testimony to have been subjected to a peer-review process in order to be admissible." Id.
3 Id. (quoting Blackmun's majority opinion, id. at 2796).
32 Id.
' Id. 'Twenty-two amicus briefs have been filed in the case, and indeed the Court's
opinion contains no less than 37 citations to amicus briefs and other secondary sources."
Id.
, Id. (emphasis added).
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Assuming arguendo that it "were desirable to make 'general observations'
not necessary to decide the questions presented, 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist
utilized the remainder of his opinion to sketch three specific disagreements
with certain observations made by the Daubert Court. First, he disputed the
Court's conclusion that "reliability" is a touchstone for admissibility of expert
testimony." Contrary to the specific language of Rule 402 regarding
relevancy, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that "there is no similar reference
in the Rule to 'reliability.""
Second, Rehnquist disputed the Court's linkage of "evidentiary relia-
bility" with "scientific validity."38 In his view, the Court's reasoning on this
point was tortuous and unconvincing because:
[t]he Court constructs its argument by parsing the language "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ... an expert...
may testify thereto .... " Fed. Rule Evid. 702. It stresses that the subject of
the expert's testimony must be "scientific ... knowledge," and points out
that "scientific" "implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science," and that the word "knowledge" "connotes more than subjective
belief or unsupported speculation." From this it concludes that "scientific
knowledge" mustbe"derivedbythe scientific method." Proposedtestimony,
we are told, must be supported by "appropriate validation." Indeed, in
footnote 9, the Court decides that "[i]n a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity."39
In discussing his divergence of opinion with the Court's dicta that
"evidentiary reliability" is a key factor bearing on the admissibility of expert
scientific testimony-with reliability being a function of "scientific validi-
ty"-the Chief Justice raised a variety of interesting and perplexing epistemo-
logical issues: (a) "Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify
on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowledge!--the other types of
expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies-or are the 'general observations'
limited only to 'scientific knowledge'?"; (b) "What is the difference
"s Id. at 2799-800.
36 Iad at 2800 (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 2794-95). The other touchstone
of admissibility of expert testimony mentioned by the Daubert majority, one which the
Chief Justice did not dispute, is "relevancy." Id
38 Id
" Id (citations omitted).40 Id.
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between scientific knowledge and technical knowledge?"; 4' (c) "[D]oes Rule
702 actually contemplate that the phrase 'scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge' be broken down into numerous subspecies of
expertise, or did its authors simply pick general descriptive language
concerning the sort of expert testimony which courts have customarily
received?"; 42 and (d) Is the question of whether a phenomenon has been or
can be empirically "tested" akin to, in the words of the Daubert Court, a
scientific theory's "falsifiability, or refutability, or testability,"4 or to
something else?"
Chief Justice Rehnquist's final specific disagreement with Daubert was
his perception of a more limited role for federal trial court judges than that
posited by the majority. While Rehnquist did "not doubt that Rule 702
confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions
of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony...., [he did] not think it
imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists in order to perform that role.
' 45
II. DAUBERT'S BROAD IMPLICATIONS
Let us be mindful of what is implicated by Daubert: admitting or
excluding expert scientific opinion in a federal civil trial is often the
difference between victory, defeat, and survival in the underlying
litigation. 6 Indeed, the petitioners in Daubert-two minor children and
their respective parents-were defeated in pursuing their tort claims for the
children's serious birth defects allegedly caused by their mother's prenatal
ingestion of the prescription drug Bendectin, because the lower courts
41 Id.
42 Id.
"Id (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 2796-97).
4Id. On this issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed. "I defer to no one in my
confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that
the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them
will be, too." Id.
4s Id. "I think the Court would be far better advised in this case to decide only the
questions presented, and to leave the further development of this important area of the law
to fiture cases." Id.
"At the very least, whether expert scientific testimony is admissible often is the
difference between a plaintiff surviving a defendant's dispositive motion, and being able
to proceed to trial, or losing the motion and being dismissed from the case. See, e.g.,
Merrell Dow Urges Ninth Circuit to Affirm Defense Summry Judgment in 'Daubert'
Case, 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 396 (Sept. 8, 1993).
1993-941
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excluded the affidavits of eight well-qualified experts. Petitioners' experts
had sought to respond to Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment,
which relied upon several affidavits in which experts stated that no
published scientific literature had demonstrated that maternal use of
Bendectin was a risk factor for human birth defects. The petitioners'
experts had prepared affidavits that averred, contrary to Merrell Dow's
assertions, that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Petitioners' experts had
based their excluded opinions on animal studies, chemical structure
analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of previously published human
statistical studies'
Scientific evidence is particularly critical to the outcomes of the
avalanche of toxic tort cases, including the Daubert case, that have been
filed during the last fifteen years." Indeed, toxic tort actions typically
involve plaintiffs who claim "actual or potential physical injuries,
emotional distress, property damages, and economic losses, which were
caused by substances in the air, ground, and water."" Accordingly,
toxic tort disputes have tended to be subsumed by and preoccupied with
the issue of toxicity: "the capacity of a chemical to produce injury or
harm ' to human beings or their property. Determining toxicity, in turn,
involves intricate and convoluted mixed questions of fact and law. In
4' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791-92 (1993).
See generally Mary A. McCoy, Test for Scientific Evidence Pits Rules Against Case Law,
7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1252 (Mar. 24, 1993) (thoroughly describing the conflicting
views presented by the parties in Daubert).
48 M. STUART MADDEN, Toxic TORTS DEsKBoOK § 12.1, at 112 (1992). See
generally Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An Historical Background,
1979-87, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85 (1992) (describing the development of toxic tort
law in cases involving Agent Orange, radioactive fallout from atomic weapons testing,
and asbestos) [hereinafter Toxic Torts History/1]; Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes
and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law, 1988-91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophi-
cal Exegesis, 18 So. ILL. LAw J. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 3, on file with
author) [hereinafter Toxic Torts History Il] (describing recent trends and emerging themes
in toxic tort cases, one of which is "the dynamics and centrality of expert witnesses in
proving causation!). See also Robert F. Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic
Tort Law: Three Overarching Metaphors and Three Sources of Law, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
795 (1992) (suggesting that the narrow focus on using more rigorous science in toxic tort
law should be replaced with a more comprehensive theory of what tort law is).
49 Toxic TORTS AND PRODuCT LIABIITY: CHANGING TACTICS FOR CHANGING
TIm 11 (Michael A. Brown ed., 1989) (emphasis added).
SO Stanley M. Pier et al., Recognition and Evaluation of Hazards, in Toxic TORTS:
LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CASES 1, 2 (G. Z.Nothstein ed., 1984) (emphasis
added).
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contrast to the traditional tort case, which involves relatively simple
issues of fact and law, toxic tort litigation usually involves a "fundamen-
tally different"' 1 level of complexity.'
In the face of traditional principles of tort law, such as burden of
proof and proximate causation, proving liability and damages in toxic tort
are often daunting tasks for plaintiffs and their attorneys. As Professor
Peter Schuck eloquently observed in his book on the complexities of the
Agent Orange litigation:
In the traditional tort case, the nature of the injury is typically rather
straightforward: an actual assault, physical collision, trespass on land,
defamatory statement, act ofprofessional malpractice, or other relatively
determinate, well-defined, traumatic interaction between the injurer and
victim. Of course, difficult issues often arise even in conventional tort
cases concerning who did what to whom, when, and with what effect.
But these difficulties can usually be addressed more or less routinely.
And when they cannot be, the putative victim is unlikely to pursue the
claim, if only because most personal injury lawyers-who typically
prosecute such claims only on a contingency fee basis (under which
they are paid a percentage of any recovery) rather than an hourly rate
basis-will not accept the case.
In the toxic tort dispute, the nature of the injury is very different
and the processes of establishing, defining, and measuring that injury
are far more complex. A chemical agent (or, less commonly, ionizing
radiation) is suspected of having harmed one or more individuals. Often
the pathways of causation are difficult to detect, the time periods extend
over decades, and the effects are not readily isolated or scientifically
understood. In some cases the victims may not even know that they
have been harmed or that their harm is associated with a particular
agent. Indeed, the victims may even be impossible to identify! In other
cases the identity of the particular injurers may be unknown, and even
if known, it may be impossible, either in principle or in practice, to
accurately allocate responsibility for the harm among them.
These extraordinary difficulties in toxic tort cases-the problems of
so-called indeterminate plaintiffs and indeterminate defendants-usually
" Note, Developments in the Law of Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1603 (1986) (citing Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmen-
tal Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV.
575, 575 (1983)).
2 C f Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 555 (1988)
(reviewing WIM H. RODGERS, JR., ENviRONMENTAL LAw: ArAND WATER (1986)).
1993-941
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
reflect not only the high cost of establishing certain facts, but also the
limited ability of existing scientific theory and methodology to establish
these facts at any price. This problem in turn may actually reflect a
more elementary epistemological uncertainty concerning what we mean
by a "fact" in the peculiar social-scientific context from which toxic
torts arise.
The distinctive character of a toxic tort fundamentally affects the
nature and course of the litigation. Entirely different forms of proof,
demanding new kinds of evidence and witnesses, are usually necessary.
Different rules of procedures, evidence, and substantive law may be
required. And if implemented, these new legal arrangements inevitably
alter the rles and relationships of litigants, lawyers, trial judges, juries,
appellate judges, research institutions, regulatory agencies, and other
governmental organs in profound ways. 3
During the last decade, the challenges and intricacies of proving toxic
causation and the empirical and normative roles that experts play in
3PEE H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANrGE ON TRLAL: MAss ToxIc DISASTERS IN THE
COU RTS 8-9 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Indeed,
[tioxic tort plaintiffs face serious obstacles in establishing the presence of one
ormore injury-causing substances, exposure, and injury resulting from exposure.
An initial difficulty is that inmost cases the precise measurement of routes and
amounts of exposure is difficult because of the random and ad hoc nature of
individual toxic tort injuries. Second, long latency periods between exposure
and resulting injury present further difficulties which may lead to the b aing
of a cause of action because the limitations period has expired. Third, while a
plaintiff may suffer some injury or disease from an antecedent toxic exposure,
traditional rules against claim splitting may impede a plaintiff's ability to reopen
the case in the future or to file a second claim based on injuries that become
manifest several years later. A fourth causation problem facing toxic tort
plaintiffs is isolation of the particular disease or ailment with the claimed toxic
exposure; given the traditional long latency period of toxic diseases between
exposure and manifestation, a plaintiff is likely to encounter defense arguments
that contend that many factors-environmental and lifestyle-may combine to
produce an illness. Fifth, even if plaintiffs can muster strong proof to link the
disease with a toxic exposure, defendants are likely to argue that the effects of
such exposure are'not necessarily unique-i.e. that background pathogens or
naturally-occurring substances could just as well have caused plaintiffs'
maladies. This argument is related to a sixth obstacle encountered by toxic tort
plaintiffs: inadequate toxicological information exacerbated by limited technol-
ogy capable of quantifying cause and effect relationships between toxins and
diseases, and the enormous expense of trying to gather whatever information or
expertise is available.
Toxic Torts History II, supra note 48 (manuscript at 31-32, on file with author).
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determining toxic causation and liability have fascinated a number of
scholars.' In recent years, these perplexing questions that exist at the
intersection of science and law have arisen in the lower state and federal
courts." Therefore, in light of the importance of the issue and a judicial
opportunity to pontificate on the subject, it is understandable why the
m See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN Toxic TORT LmGATION (1988); Psa W. HUBER,
GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595 (1988); Bert Black & David E.
Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732
(1984); Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction
to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L. REv. 629 (1991); Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with
Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting andAssessing
Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1989); Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift From Individual to Group Responsibility
in the Law of Causation ofInjury, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473 (1986); Kenneth J. Chesebro,
Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993);
Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindel" Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982); Michael Dore, A Proposed Sandard for
Evaluating the Use ofEpidemiological Evidence in Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injwy
Cases, 28 How. L.J. 677 (1985); E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure:
Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989); Daniel
A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1987); Alani Golanski, Judicial
Scrutiny of Expert Testimony in Environmental Tort Litigation, 9 PACE ENvrL. L. REv.
399 (1992); Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is
There Any Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909 (1986); Peter W. Huber, On Law
and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV,. 319 (1990); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the
Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L.- REV. 521 (1986); Glen
0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
REv. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Jack B.
Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RIcH. L. REV. 473 (1986); Leslie Ellen
Tick, Beyond the Dalkon Shield- Proving Causation Against 1UD Manufacturers for PD
Related Injury, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 639 (1983).
s See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (examining the scientific studies on causality, but determining that persuasive
evidence of causality had not been produced in a class action brought against the United
States government and numerous chemical manufacturers for the deaths and injuries of
thousands of Vietnam veterans who came into contact with herbicides used in war); Allen
v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 416-17 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (discussing the difference between
scientific statistical significance and legal preponderance of evidence); Oxendine v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. 1986) (holding that
plaintiff's expert in a Bendectin case had sufficient foundation for his testimony when he
relied upon chemical analyses, animal studies, in vitro studies, and recalculations of
epidemiological studies).
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Justices of the Supreme Court might have been inclined to discuss not
only the reasons why the Federal Rules of Evidence had eclipsed Frye,
but also scientific evidence and scientific experts generally.
mH. SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF "GENERAL OBSERVATIONS"
One can articulate a number of plausible arguments supporting the
Daubert Court's use of "general observations" on expert scientific
testimony to augment its ratio decidendi that Frye's "general acceptance"
standard has been overruled by the enactment of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. First, because of the importance of the question presented,
the rarified federal issues at stake, and the ruling's impact on the day-to-
day evidentiary "judgment calls" by federal trial court judges presiding
over technical jury trials throughout the nation, the Court probably
wanted to provide administrative guidance to the federal courts that will
be making rulings on admissibility of scientific expert testimony in an
unfamiliar legal landscape without Frye. In essence, cognizant that Frye
was now clearly buried, the Court probably wanted to settle the meaning
of its ruling in Daubert up-front, instead of over a period of years.'
A second argument supporting the use of "general observations" on
scientific expert testimony in Daubert is that Rule 702's ambiguous use
of the word "knowledge" '57 as the predicate of an expert opinion requires
authoritative amplification and contextual grounding by the Court.
Certainly, "knowledge" as used in Rule 702 means more than a single
subjective opinion or 'usupported speculation,""8 what some courts
have referred to as a "net opinion," but precisely how much more?
Moreover, during oral argument, the Court's colloquy with counsel often
led to abstruse discussions of the nature of "scientific knowledge" which,
arguably, required explication by the Court in order to avoid future
confusion and litigation in implementing Daubert
' Cf. SUP. Cr. R. 10.1(c) (stating that one of the considerations for granting a writ
of.certiorari is that a court of appeals "has decided an important question of federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by [the] Court"). But see 'Daubert" Will Not
Resolve Confusion Over Expert Evidence, Attorneys Agree, 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 44,
45 (June 16, 1993) (noting that one attorney at the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America Conference predicted that "due to a combination of conservatism and lack of
experience in trying such cases, the [Court] will give no useful guidance as to what
standards should be used in admitting testimony by scientific experts, but will 'let lower
courts wander around for a while").
'7FED. R. EVID. 702.
' Daubert v. Me rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).59 Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
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Third, the Court may have been justified in providing some extended
commentary on the interrelationship between Rule 702 and its cognate
provisions such as Rules 703, 104, and 403 because of the apparent
interconnections between the provisions.' Rule 702 constitutes the critical
inquiry in determining the competency of an expert to testify to a
particular fact or opinion.
Fourth, in light of the high profile concern in some quarters about the
proliferation of "junk science" or "quack medicine" in civil cases,6 the
Daubert Court might defend its elaboration of "general principles"
regarding the admission of scientific expert testimony on political
grounds. A bare bones decision overruling the Frye "general acceptance"
test, without any amplification of the meaning of its order, could be
viewed as a significant relaxing of scientific rigor by the Court in the
federal judiciary's adjudication of complex litigations involving such
subjects as biology, medicine, and chemistry.' Therefore, the Court was
reasonably justified in explaining that such an interpretation would be
misguided. In so doing, the Court narrowed the debate from "What is
junk science?" to 'What is reliable science?"
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE COuRT's "GENERAL OBSERVATIONS"
Conversely, Chief Justice Rehnquist's objections to the Court's
"general observations" about expert scientific testimony are trenchant
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1341, 1343, 1345-47 (Apr. 14, 1993) (oral
argument occurred on March 30, 1993).
® See generally id at 1343-45, 1347 (discussing the interplay of these rules).
See generally HUBER, sipra note 54 (taking a very critical look at expert
testimony); John Endicott, Quack Medicine and Tort Litigation: The Scientific Method or
"Methodology?", 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 288 (July 29, 1992) (advocating that courts
adhere to the scientific method in order to determine the reliability of expert testimony
in toxic tort litigation).
' See generally Ernest I. Getto et al., The Arfffication of Science: The Problem of
Unscientific "Scientific" Evidence, 23 ENVTL. L. REv. 10435 (July 1993) (discussing the
problems resulting from allowing evidence that lacks a firn scientific basis-'artified"
science-4o be admitted in toxic-tort and other environmental cases). For example,
[poor jury verdicts in cases involving crucial scientific questions are often the
result of poor evidentiary decisions. Once artified science is admitted, the
sympathetic synergies created by mixing a suffering plaintiff with a deep-
pocketed defendant often produce some level of judgment in favor of the
suffering plaintiff, no matter what the state of the "scientific" evidence. This is
why the evidentiary question is crucial to courts that are interested in facilitating
tuhful decisions.
Id. at 10444.
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
criticisms of the expansive sweep of the Daubert opinion. Indeed, in the
first part of his opinion, his "procedural dissent," the Chief Justice made
out a prudent and well-reasoned case that once the Court decided the first
question presented-whether the Frye general acceptance test survived the
enactment of the Rules-in the negative, the further question presented
was mooted."' Paradoxically, the Daubert Court's "general comments"
on expert scientific testimony present a double-edged risk. Some lower
courts will give the comments "great weight," as feared by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. In light of the abstract quality of the comments, however,
other lower courts will likely choose to ignore them by following the
admonition of Justice Jackson in Armour & Co. v. Wantock:
It is timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to
be read in light of the facts of the case under discussion. To keep
opinions within reasonable bounds precludes writing into them every
limitation or variation which might be suggested by the circumstances
of cases not before the Court. General expressions transposed to other
facts are often misleading.'
Moreover, previous commentators have amplified and elaborated on
the underlying rationale of Rehnquist's procedural dissent in Daubert by
observing that the mootness doctrine "is based [in part] on the [judicia-
ry's] desire not to waste time in the futile decision of abstract questions,
and in part on the belief that it is dangerous to formulate important
precedents without an adequate, wholehearted and controversial presenta-
tion of the issue."65 Because "[m]oot cases have often been equated to
advisory opinions .... there is a danger that advisory opinions will
create undesirable precedents because the 'impact of actuality' is
wanting."' Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist would contend that in spite
of the voluminous number of amiei briefs and the discussion of various
bodies of scientific knowledge set forth in the briefs before the Court, this
6 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. The traditional mootness doctrine
has two alternative bases: (1) the Article III test of justiciability requiring a "case or
controversy," see, e.g., United States Parole Conm'nv. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-97
(1980); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971), or (2) nonconstitutional
discretionary elements of the justiciability doctrine, see, e.g., Kremens v. Bartley, 431
U.S. 119, 134 n.15 (1977).
6Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132 (1944) (emphasis added).
Note, "Moot" Administrative Orders, 53 HARV. L. REV. 628, 629-30 (1940)
(footnote omitted).
6Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
772, 774 (1955).
[Vol. 82
DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow
process ofjudicial decisionmaking is flawed because it is piecemeal, general,
and not in the context of a live controversy.
The Chief Justice certainly is correct in asserting that "the ultimate legal
question [in Daubert depended] on an appreciation of one or more bodies of
knowledge not judicially noticeable."' Rule 201's parameters for
judicial notice of adjudicative facts .... [require that a] judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
Indeed, the "definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific
validity and peer review"' that the Court gleaned from secondary books,
articles, and amici briefs to craft its "general observations" on expert scientific
testimony are probably subject to "reasonable dispute' and are not "capable
of accurate and ready determination" for three independent reasons.
First, in light of the philosophical and imprecise nature of definitions, it
is likely that there are contending viewpoints as to meaning overlooked by the
Court. Second, notions of "peer review" and "scientific validity" should be
viewed in context, since different scientific disciplines may vary in their
interpretation of these principles. Third, even if these concepts did span all
scientific disciplines, reaching such a conclusion of definitional closure seems
to require an ambitious, synoptical, and intellectual analysis of history not
readily performed by appellate judges or their law clerks.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's specific points of disagreement with the
Daubert Court's "general observations" on expert scientific testimony are also
persuasive regarding the remainder of the majority's opinion. Rehnquist's first
two specific objections to Daubert question the Court's analytical construct,
which placed the nontextual "evidentiary reliability'-a phrase that the
majority equates with "scientific validity' in cases involving proffered expert
scientific testimony-on the same level of importance as Rule 402's precise
textual reference to "relevancy."'70 This use of terminology by the Daubert
Court is flawed because of(a) a lack ofprecision in defining basic terminolo-
gy in that the majority does not "set clear boundaries" between what the
"Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
"o See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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definitions include and what they exclude (for example, that the "scientific
status of a theory depends on its 'alsifiability'); 7" (b) the inherent ambigu-
ity of references to broad, philosophical benchmarks like "scientific,"
"scientific knowledge," "appropriate validation," and "scientific validity";'
(c) the idiosyncratic definition of many of these terms73 based on a linkage
to the "scientific method";74 (d) incomplete definitions that rely upon the
meaning of other terms that the Court failed to define,75 as well as key
boundary questions that the Court left unresolved, such as the "difference
between scientific knowledge and technical knowledge"76; and (e) the
availability of counterfactual examples.
Furthermore, the Chief Justice's third specific objection to the "general
observations" of the Court in Daubert, that Rule 702 does not impose on
federal judges in their "gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony... either the obligation or the
authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role,"'78 is
well-founded and makes pragmatic sense. In this regard, Rehnquist's more
flexible interpretation of Rule 702 is equally as plausible as the majority's
arguable overemphasis on judicial determination of "scientific validity" and
insistence on strict adherence to the "scientific method '79 when expert
scientific testimony is proffered for admission into evidence at trial. It seems
reasonable to suppose that the key factor contemplated by the drafters of Rule
702 was whether "specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
7' See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See generally PIERRE SCHLAG & DAVID
SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING 13 (1986) [hereinafter LEGAL REASONING]
(explaining the problems that could arise with the use of an imprecise term); cf. infra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
' See generally LEGAL REASONING, supra note 71, at 14 (showing how ambiguity
can result in a word having two or more meanings).
' See generally id. at 14-15 (stating that definitions lead to value-laden or politically
charged biases).
74 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
71 See generally LEGAL REASONING, supra note 71, at 16 (discussing the impact of
incomplete definitions). For example, the Court does not define what it means by
"scientific method," "appropriate validation," or "falsifiability." See supra notes 36-44 and
accompanying text.
7" See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
'n See LEGAL REASONING, supra note 71, at 16-17. For instance, in trying to explain
a new phenomenon, scientists may theorize by analogy to other known processes and
even engage in some speculation, thereby not following the strict scientific method in
their initial approach to a problem. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
7' Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
7' See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,"" and not
whether the proper scientific methodology supported any or all of the
expert's opinion. Rather, it is probable that Rule 702 has a broader
meaning and purpose than the Daubert majority's narrow focus on what
may be called "scientific correctness."
Conceivably, theories, speculation, and nonempirical systemic ideas
offered by a knowledgeable scientific expert at one point in his or her
testimony might assist the trier of fact in better conceptualizing a problem
and in reaching a factual determination on an issue like causation. For
example, if we assume that Rule 702 was applicable in the early part of
the twentieth century when Einstein came up with his "Special Theory on
Relativity," and if we further assume that Einstein was called to testify
in a civil case involving the issue of what is the speed of light, it might
be helpful to the jury in making its determination to listen to the well-
known, far-fetched, but concrete examples that Einstein used to illustrate
his theory."' A wise trial court judge might allow this type of testimony
into evidence, subject to later limiting instructions or a later determination
under Rule 403 that potential confusion might. outweigh probative
value.'a Moreover, in light of the past unsuccessful attempts by com-
mentators to convince Congress that "scientific courts"83 should adjudi-
cate scientific adjudicative cases," the Court arguably overstepped its
role in interpreting congressional intent in promulgating Rule 702.
V. PRECEDENTIAL QuOLITY oF THE COURT'S
"GENERAL OBSERVATIONS"
Were I a legislator, I might be coaxed into voting for a statute very
much like that which the Court ends up confusedly drfting in the course
FED. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added).
u Some examples might be locomotive engines flying through space or train station
observers suspended in time.FED. L EVlD. 403.
These consist of "experts" who would apply "good science:'
84See generally James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court", 75 MIcH. L. REV.
1058, 1059 (1977) (discussing arguments in favor of and against the use of science courts
to answer "scientific questions involved in public policy issues"); Judicial Panel
Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 1127 (1993) (Steven J. Grossman,
moderator) (transcript of judicial panel discussion of scientific testimony and its use in
litigation); Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: 4 Proposal for Expert Judges at the
Tial Level, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 474 (1993) (proposing the creation of "Magistrate
Judge (Expert)" to decide difficult technical cases).
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of its discussion of "general observations" on expert scientific evi-
dence."5 However, in the context of interpreting the Rules, which were
promulgated by congressional imprimatur,"s the Court should not have
acted as a super-legislature by, in effect, making an unsubstantiated
amendment.
The pivotal issue in determining whether Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion or the majority opinion in Daubert is correct is to decide the
precedential quality-or stare decisis-of the "general observations" of the
Daubert Court. One way of doing this is to ask whether the Court's
"general observations" were in the nature of an amplification of the ratio
decidendi that Frye did not survive the enactment of the Rules, or
whether those comments were obiter dicta, which is generally perceived
to be a counterproductive undertaking for a court." The problem,
however, is that "[tihe distinction between holdings and dicta is often
difficult to discern, especially in modem cases."'ss One commentator has
described this difficulty in somewhat cynical terms by saying that
[t]he traditional view is that a dictum is a statement in an opinion not
necessary to the decision of the case. This means nothing. The only
statement in an appellate opinion strictly necessary to the decision of the
85 I would, however, insist that the statute contain more concrete and precise
definitions of terminology.6 After extensive study, Congress enacted the federal rules-as proposed in the
Supreme Court's proposed Federal Rules of Evidence-with various amendments, to
become effective July 1, 1975. 2 McCoRMIcK ON EvIDENCE, App. A, at 547 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). "Thus the Federal Rules of Evidence are the product of both
the rulemaking process established by the Supreme Court and the legislative process of
the Congress." Id.
See, e.g., Cooke v. New River Co., L.R. 38 Ch. D. 56, 70-71 (1888) (Bowen,
I am extremely reluctant to decide anything except what is necessary for the
special case, because I believe by long experience that judgments come with far
more weight and gravity when they come upon points which the judges are
bound to decide, and I believe that obiter dicta, like the proverbial chickens of
destiny, come home to roost sooner or later in a very uncomfortable way to the
Judges who have uttered them, and are a great source of embarrassment in
future cases.
Id. quoted in ROBERT A. LEPLAP, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPImONS 56 (1974); Yarmouth
v. France, L.J. 57 Q.B. 9 (1887) (Lord Esher, M.R.) ("I detest any attempt to bring the
law into maxims. Maxims are invariably wrong, that is, they are so general and large that
they always include something which is not intended to be included."), quoted in LEFLAR,
supra, at 59; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.) ("General
propositions do not decide concrete cases."), quoted in LEFLAI, supra, at 59.
"8 OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 6, at 602.
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case is the order of the court. A quibble like this shows how useless the
definition is.
Presumably, the Daubert Court could take the position that its
"general observations" on expert scientific testimony are linked to its
holding regarding the inapplicability of the Frye rule. As such, the
"general comments" portion of the opinion could be reasonably interpret-
ed as being part of the Daubert ratio decidendi. But future cases
involving the admissibility of "specialized knowledge" under Rule 702
are likely to create perplexing issues for the Court in reconciling a trial
court's sense of the justice of admitting expert scientific testimony with
the scientific community's position on the scientific correctness of the
evidence. Therefore, I predict that the Court will reserve the right to
"label" portions of its general statements in Daubert as being dicta in
order to avoid "[a] statement of the law that conflicts with the view[s] of
[various Justices]"" in future, difficult to resolve cases.
Another method of determining the precedential quality of the
Daubert Court's "general observations" on expert scientific testimony is
to approach the question from the standpoint of whether or not those
judicial observations are in the nature of advisory opinions.9 Even if the
Court's "general observations" were deemed to be rendered on a moot
question and, therefore, advisory in nature, the Daubert majority could
defend its exegesis on scientific evidence as falling under the "public
interest exception' to the prohibition on judicial advisory opinions&'
The best way, however, of evaluating the normative quality of
Daubert's "general observations" on expert scientific evidence is to follow
the approach advocated by Senior United States District Court Judge Jack
Weinstein: admit that "American judges [do], in fact, [render] advisory
opinions" 3 that often involve moot questions and obiter dicta, and focus
inquiry, instead, on the policy wisdom of the so-called judicial observa-
tions. The policy wisdom, according to Weinstein, should be evaluated
by asking a number of probing normative questions:
-9 Comment, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. Rsv. 509, 509-18 (1952), quoted in
LBFAR, supra note 87, at 59.
'o LEFLAR, sVra note 87, at 59.
9' See generally supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers
of rendering advisory opinions).
n See Note, supra note 66, at 787, quoted in LEFLAR, supra note 87, at 63.
Jack Weinstein, Rendering Advisory Opinions-Do We, Should We?, 54
JUDICATURE 140, 143 (1970), quoted in LEFLAR, spra note 87, at 63-64.
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To what extent should [courts] move along the line from traditional
American concepts ofjudicial functions toward advisory opinions? What
are the dangers which need to be faced? Do courts run the risk of losing
their sense of neutrality, of being committed to programs, and, perhaps,
of becoming less credible in their stance of impartiality? ... How far
and how fast may or should the courts go, and what limits, if any,
should there be?'
Resolution of the Weinsteinian project,"5 in the context of evaluating the
"general comments" of the Daubert Court on expert scientific testimony,
results in a vindication of the concerns raised by Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE WEINSTEIN
AND ZIMAN APPROACHES
In evaluating the policy wisdom of the differing opinions of the
Justices in Daubert, it is useful to turn to a sturdy scholarly benchmark:
a book on the philosophy of science by John Ziman6 that was relied
upon and cited in the majority opinion." Professor Ziman's book is
helpful in evaluating the Daubert opinions because it amplifies, expands
upon, and critiques several of the principles and presuppositions
articulated by the Justices.
By way of introduction to the complex subject of scientific reliability,
Ziman begins his work with a riveting counterintuitive assertion: "It is
important to realize that much of the research literature of science is
intended rhetorically-to persuade other scientists of the validity of a new
hypothesis or to shatter received opinions."' This contention, in turn,
leads him to question Karl Popper's famous criterion, which lies at the
heart of the general comments of the Daubert Court, that an acceptable
4 Id.
' See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
96 JOHN ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATON Op TIE GROUNDS FOR
BELIEF iN SCIENcE (1978). Ziman is Professor Emeritus of Physics at the University of
Bristol.
9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
ZIMAN, supra note 96, at 7. Elsewhere in the book, Ziman observes: "A scientific
message often has the purpose of changing a preconceived notion, demonstrating an
unsuspected contradiction, or announcing an unexpected observation. It is addressed to
an actual skeptic, a potential critic; it must be convincing, it must be watertight." Id. at
12. Moreover, "intersubjective communication and persuasion are key factors in the
machinery of science," according to Ziman. Id. at 32.
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scientific theory should, in principle, befalsifiable9 Ziman characteriz-
es Popper's criterion as "strategically sound but tactically indefensi-
ble"'00 because of Popper's failure to realize the essentially rhetorical
quality of scientific communication and the resulting ontological flux of
cutting edge scientific knowledge. As Ziman explains, "[ilt turns out, in
practice, that almost every theory is to some extent 'falsified' by the
relevant observations: the question then hinges on whether this failure is
to be treated as a genuine objection, or whether, pending conceivable
improvements in formulation or computation, it may be temporarily over-
looked., ,1 '
Ziman also argues that a cognate problem of the inherent subjectivity
of an individual scientist's view of what is or is not reliable knowledge
is the related epistemological problem of paradigmatic multiplicity, "of
interrelated models, experiments, concepts, mathematical techniques,
' Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (emphasis added); see also KARL R. PoPPER, THE
LOGIC OF SCENMC DISCOVERY (1959). A classic work on the philosophy of science,
Popper is viewed by many as the most important contemporary philosopher of science.
His major argument is that a hypothesis is scientific only if it can specify the results that
would show it to be false. This allowed Popper to criticize as "pseudo-scientific" theories
such as Maxismn that prove to be circular in reasoning and are not capable of being
shown to be falsifiable.
100 ZIMAN, supra note 96, at 35.
1Id. Professor Ziman illustrates this assertion with a physicist's saga of "missing
solar neutrins":
Briefly, the accepted theories of nuclear reactions in the core of the sun predict
the generation of a large flux of neutrinos, which should be observable as they
pass through the earth. The neutrino is a very, very elusive particle, but it can
be observed very, very occasionally, by very large, refined and expensive
apparatus. Experiments of this kind, on a heroic scale, have not confirmed the
theory; the flux of solar neutrinos is not precisely measurable, but in all
experiments appears to be very much less than the theoretical value. But what
has been falsified? Even if we accept the experimental results at their face
value, this does not necessarily mean that the theory of nuclear reactions is all
wrong. The calculations make many assumptions, such as the rate of mixing in
the solar interior, or the uniformity of conditions over long periods of time, that
are difficult to decide independently and that strongly affect the results. Some
astrophysicists interpret the anomaly as a radfcal falsification of the theory, and
are looking for new basic models of the solar-enerey source; others, with equal
justfication, estimate the consequences ofplausible modifications in the details
of the conventional model, in order to "explain away" the anomaly. Whatever
the outcome of this episode, which vividly illustrates the turmoil of imagination,
scepticism and criticism, and the dynamical interaction between theory and
observation, in this branch of science, only the hindsight of armchair theorists
will eventually explain to us what was really being falsified and why.
Id at 35-36 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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instrunents, materials, properties, etc. that constitute the corpus [of
scientific knowledge]""0 2 in a particular field. Focusing on his own field
of physics, Professor Ziman observes:
Our confidence in any particular element of this science cannot be
rested solely upon one or two other elements, but is deeply embedded
in our consciousness of a multitude of related facts and opinions. Not
all the elements of the network are of equal weight or credibility, but
they must all be taken into account in an assessment of the reliability
of our knowledge in that field. Many particular consequences of a
theory may seem far from the experimental facts, yet the picture as a
whole may be completely convincing for its consistency and wide
application. Physicists do not accept the Schrtdinger equation of wave
mechanics just because it happened (like the Bohr theory of planetary
orbits) to give the observed spectrum of a hydrogen atom: wave
mechanics now stands unquestioned because it could explain more or
less quantitatively, more or less successfully, almost all the properties
of atoms, molecules and crystals. When, for a time, it seems to fail to
explain some unusual phenomenon such as superconductivity, we
scarcely conceive that it has been falsified, but assume that we have
made a mistake in our calculations, or that we have misunderstood the
physical situation."
Moreover, Zinan points out that in the real day-to-day world of
scientific research and validation, the collective creation of reliable
knowledge often follows tortuous and unpredictable pathways. By way
of illustration, he writes:
[A physicist's] personal experience of the validation of scientific
theories is usually very sobering. He learns how easy it is to persuade
oneself of the validity of a model which later turns out to be false, and
comes to realise that even in very strongly mathematical and well-
defined scientific issues, it may take a long time, much criticism and the
death of many promising conjectures (if not necessarily of their
authors!) before a reliable theory is well-based and thoroughly accept-
able.
"2 Id. at 39. Ziman limited the language in the text to a description of physical
science. Id. Nonetheless, his description-with some substitutes like the word "biomass"
for "materials" and "behavior" for "properties"-would readily apply to other branches of
science as well.
"o Id. at 39-40 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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Even in physics, there is no infallible procedure for generating
reliable knowledge. The calm order and perfection of well-established
theories, accredited by innumerable items of evidence from a thousand
different hands, eyes, and brains, is not characteristic of the frontline
of research where controversy, conjecture, contradiction and confusion
are rfe. The physics of undergraduate text-books is 90% true; the
contents of the primary research journals ofphysics is 90% false. The
scientific system is as much involved in distilling the former out of the
latter as it is in creating and transferring more and more bits of data and
items of "information!''
14
The force of Professor Ziman's systematic analysis of the complex
nature of the modem scientific process, both at the macro-level of elusive
consensus and at the micro-level of subjective meaning, tends to undercut
the hubris of the general observations on expert scientific testimony
created by the Daubert majority. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
warning that "definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method,
scientific validity, and peer review .... [warrant the Court] ... to
proceed with great caution in deciding more than [it has] to because [its]
reach can so easily exceed [its] grasp' ' 5 sounds prophetic.
In the first place, while it is likely that a particular scientist's theory
or technique can be tested, the significance of test results will vary
depending on the particular scientist or group of scientists being
questioned. Second, even if a scientific opinion in court has attracted
widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community, the
reliability of the opinion may be questionable because of the tendency of
set opinions to resist significant modification over time for purely
sociological reasons. Third, in some areas of science, a striking percent-
age of journal literature will eventually be refuted and rejected; therefore,
use of peer-reviewed publications as important indicia of scientific
reliability seems arbitrary. As a corollary to this point, potential error
rates and the existence and maintenance of standards for a particular
scientific methodology are also due to substantial flux over time and
between disciplines.
104 Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added).
.0 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Robert Browning wrote that a person's 'reach should exceed his grasp, [o]r what's
a heaven for?" ROBERT BROWNING, ANDREA DEL SARTO (1855), quoted in JOHN
BART='r, F~mnm QUOTAnONS 543 (15th ed. 1980). Chief Justice Rehnquist's choice
of language--"our reach can so easily exceed our grasp"-seems to be a play on
Browning's words.
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In short, the Court in Daubert has committed itself to a particular
mode of interpretation regarding scientific reliability and admissibility of
scientific evidence in federal courts that goes beyond the demonstrable
text of the evidentiary rules. It seems likely that the Court in future
opinions will attempt to defend its general comments and expound on
them in the nature of continuing advisory opinions on the standards for
reliable scientific knowledge. Even if such a judicial approach helps to
manage the processing of scientific expert opinions in federal trials, it
risks distorting the real nature of science and societal truth seeking.
CONCLUSION
The Daubert decision moves the federal judiciary away from the Frye
"general acceptance" test for expert scientific testimony toward what may
be characterized as a "general reliability" test. The Daubert opinion's
grasp, however, exceeds its reach because of Professor Ziman's descrip-
tion of the profound ambiguity associated with generating "reliable
knowledge," even by way of ostensibly "rigorous" processes like the
"scientific method." Ironically, the seven Justices who agreed with the
majority opinion in Daubert committed, by way of analogy, the conceptu-
al mistake that laypersons often get trapped into making about the law.
As any first year law student will point out to well-meaning relatives at
a family gathering, there is no such thing as reliable blackletter rules in
law. For every rule, there is an exception. For every principle, there is a
counter-principle. So it is, as Ziman has explained, for science.
It may well be appropriate for the Court to encourage good scientific
methodology and reasoning in adjudication before the federal courts.
However, it is dangerous for the Court to straitjacket the development of
scientific knowledge as it is broadly understood and applied to human
problems and institutions. Only time will tell the magnitude of the
dangers wrought by Daubert. For the moment, however, the Daubert
decision seems to articulate a policy at war with itself: on the one hand,
endorsing a "liberal" vision of the admissibility of scientific evidence
under Rule 702 and, on the other hand, creating a series of amorphous
and artificial barriers to admissibility based on a narrow and unrealistic
view of "scientific correctness." 106
'6' See generally Special Report-Daubert: What's Next?, 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No.
9, Pt. II (Summer/Fall 1993) (offering several articles on the implications of Daubert on
various aspects of toxic tort litigation); Timothy B. Dyk & Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert
Doesn't End Debate on Experts, NAT'L LAW J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 17 (outlining the
questions left unanswered by Daubert); Expert Opinion, Brave New World, 13 CAL.
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LAWYE 31 (Sept. 1993) (examination of Daubert opinion); see also Ronald J. Allen &
Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory ofExperts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1131 (1993) (discussing how courts deal with the decision of either educating
the jurors or deferring to expert witnesses); Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense of a
Constitutional Theory of Experts, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1182 (1993) (considering how
educating the jury can cause violations of the hearsay rule and the Fifth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause); Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control Over Expert Testimony: Of
Deference and Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156 (1993) (giving reasons why courts
should become stricter on expert testimony); Edward 3. Imwinkelried, The Educational
Significance of the Syllogistic Structure of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1148
(1993) (explaining why experts should be able to educate the jury on certain issues); Paul
R. Rice, Expert Testimony: A Debate Between Logic or Tradition Rather Than Between
Deference or Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1166 (1993) (supporting the idea of
educating the jury).

